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Donald Trump’s inauguration has sparked a reassessment of America’s role in the world through
the president’s statements about its interaction with international institutions, its willingness to
intervene in foreign conﬂicts, and exercise forms of ‘soft power’.  Debates about the nature of
American power, and whether it constitutes a modern ‘empire’, have been on-going for decades.
Andrew Mumford reframes the debate by identifying four schools of thought that have emerged:
the Advocates, the Cautious Optimists, the Critics, and the Deniers. He assesses where the debate
stands at the start of a new presidency.
In what was seen as one of the starkest inaugural addresses ever delivered by a new president, Donald Trump’s
focus was predominantly a domestic one, promising to end what he labelled the ‘American carnage’ of job losses,
welfare dependency, and gang violence. Yet there were a few intimations as to how he intended to conduct
America’s foreign policy for the duration of his four year term. He stated that: ‘We do not seek to impose our way of
life on anyone, but rather to let it shine as an example for everyone to follow.’ This implied a distinct turn in American
engagement with the world, hinting at a retreat from the interventionist stance of administrations for the past few
decades. The wider question that Trump’s foreign policy platform creates is what this does to depictions of American
power at home and abroad.
Expansionism across the frontier in pursuit of a ‘manifest destiny’ has been a marked feature of the American
Republic since independence in the late eighteenth century. As the nation grew from its original thirteen colonies, in
the nineteenth century the push westward triggered wars with native Indians, Spaniards and Mexicans as Thomas
Jeﬀerson’s self-proclaimed ‘empire of liberty’ annexed land to fulﬁl a nascent set of ideological, economic and
strategic national interests. Yet the territorial expansion of the nation halted with the connection of two oceans. The
United States dominated the continent as the nation consolidated its expanse. Through participation in two world
wars and the creation of a dominant economy via a huge workforce and mass resources, American isolationism in
world aﬀairs gradually eroded.  The bigger question, though, remains whether this made America an empire in
some form, and whether the exercise of its power abroad constitute acts of American imperialism.
Labelling American Power
How best to label the role and character of American power in the world? Raymond Aron was in no doubt that
America constituted an ‘Imperial Republic’ in its actions during the early Cold War because of the way he perceived
the US expanded the concept of containment to become an imperially-imposed doctrine for a new international
order. Numerous sobriquets have been used by other scholars, each of which, Michael Cox has argued, seems
inadequate: ‘superpower’ is a little blatant; ‘hegemon’ too vague; ‘unipolar’ too restrictive. ‘Empire’, however, is a tag
imbued with both ideological and military functions that allows for the normative character and the resource
capabilities of the country to be taken into consideration.
Michael Doyles’ seminal deﬁnition of empire constructs it as ‘a system of interaction between two political entities,
one of which, the dominant metropole, exerts political control over the internal and external policy – the eﬀective
sovereignty – of the other, the subordinate periphery.’ Notions of America as an ‘empire’ have more often than not
been used alongside some adjective to characterise a particular aspect of American power projection. We therefore
have America as an ‘Incoherent Empire’ (Michael Mann), as an ‘Empire in Denial’ (Andrew Bachevich) and as
‘Empire Lite’ (Michael Ignatieﬀ). The decades’ long debate about the existence of an American Empire has broadly
1/4
created four schools of thought that I label the Advocates (those who embrace the label and beneﬁts of modern
imperialism); the Cautious Optimists (those who believe that if used properly modern American imperialism can be a
liberal force for good); the Critics (those who decry American imperial pretension); and the Deniers (those who
argue that no such thing as an American Empire exists).
The Advocates
Leading the Advocates school of thought are modern neo-conservatives like Niall Ferguson and Max Boot. Their
forceful advocacy of a pro-imperial interpretation of modern American history leads Advocates to not see empire as
a dirty word. Ferguson has gone as far as to claim that Americans should shrug oﬀ any timidity around using the
label ‘empire’ to describe their country’s global inﬂuence because American power projection is not only
expansionist and self-righteous, it is an unquestionable force for good. Like the self-styled liberal empire built by
Britain in the nineteenth century the rhetoric and actions that have come to deﬁne the modern American imperium
has led to a perceptible historical irony whereby, as Ferguson has mischievously put it, the anti-colonial foundations
of the United States are so compromised by similarities to its British imperial predecessor that the rebellious child
has now grown up to resemble the once despised parent. One of the main catalysts to such a transformation has
arguably been America’s engagement in a series of counter-insurgency wars to fend oﬀ sub-state threats to gradual
expansionism of the frontier in North America and abroad as a ‘sphere of inﬂuence’ spread. Max Boot made this
connection when writing a history of American ‘small wars’ in the early twentieth century, observing that he was
simultaneously ‘chronicling the political course of American empire.’ American success in counter-insurgency wars
before the Second World War benignly created, to Boot’s mind at least, a ‘family of democratic capitalist nations that
eagerly seek shelter under Uncle Sam’s umbrella’. The American Empire, for the Advocates, is benevolent and held
together consensually.
The Cautious Optimists
This assumption is challenged to some extent by the Cautious Optimists, like Michael Ignatieﬀ. This position shifts
the basic ideological interpretation of American Empire from a neo-conservative one to a liberal one. From such a
standpoint Ignatieﬀ has argued that although not seeking to build an empire in a traditional sense the United States
has built a version of ‘empire lite’ whose touchstones are the advocacy of human rights, the spreading of democracy,
and free markets – all of which is aggressively protected by unrivalled military prowess. Liberal notions of American
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Empire being used as a force for good in international politics by occasionally using force to uphold fundamental
rights informs Geir Lundestad’s description of America establishing an ‘empire by invitation’ in the early Cold War.
This was a consensual process where the US supported allies in rebuilding their economies after the Second World
War and provided a military bulwark against Soviet encroachment. Invitations from European nations to provide
economic, political and military assistance, Lundestad argues, were extended by other countries on other continents
in the subsequent decades. These governments saw American protection as an important mechanism to uphold
democratic rights that would have been curtailed by communist rivals. For the Cautious Optimists, this makes the
foundation of the American Empire one of accident not design in reluctant fulﬁlment of its own liberal, perhaps
utopian, world view.
The Critics
But the use of the very word ‘empire’ really only received a positive tone in recent decades. Its origins in the
American debate was as a label of denigration used by the third identiﬁable school of thought, the Critics, in regard
to American foreign policy actions in the Cold War. Critics perceive American foreign policy since 1945 as being so
imbued with perceptions of benevolence and righteousness (something the Cautious Optimists applaud) that
William Appleman Williams coined the phrase ‘the imperialism of idealism’  to describe the ideological zeal that
accompanied American expansionism and interventions abroad. More contemporary Critics, like Chalmers Johnson
perceive that the nature of American imperialism lies in its mass network of foreign military bases in countries all
over the world. This provides the US, Johnson argues, with the capacity to ‘garrison the globe’ via the permanent
deployment of over half a million service personnel to over 700 military bases on every continent bar Antarctica. In
short, America’s empire is militaristic and predicated upon the sheer physical presence of its armed forces. This is a
theme recurrent in Michael Mann’s characterisation of America as an ‘incoherent empire’ that practices what he
critically labels ‘new imperialism’ – a blend of coercive and occupationist tendencies with more informal modes of
hegemonic inﬂuence in political and economic realms. The Critics coalesce on the left of the political spectrum and
decry the course and conduct of American foreign relations most audibly when against the backdrop of controversial
wars, such as in Vietnam and Iraq.
The Deniers
The ﬁnal discernible set of scholars to have staked a claim in the American Empire debate are the Deniers. They
argue, as Desmond King and David Lake have done, that although the US may act in an imperial fashion this is not
the same as being an empire. The Deniers counter the notion that American actions even ﬁt within the rubric of a
debate about imperialism. Benjamin Barber has argued that far from being an interventionist or expansionist
imperial power, the majority of American foreign policy actions abroad have been undertaken to ensure future
reductions in expeditionary warfare. As such, any Pax Americana is based ‘not to secure the world for US purposes,
but only to secure the USA from the world.’ The implications of the post-9/11 ‘security dilemma’ largely nulliﬁed such
a distinction as America’s search for absolute security at home necessitated controlling the internal and external
policies of other states, through both hard and soft power mechanisms.
America’s imperial problem
Although not an empire builder in the traditional sense in which nearly every vestige of the occupied territory is
controlled by the metropole, America has got itself, in Andrew Bacevich’s words, ‘an imperial problem’ which
successive presidents have refused to acknowledge. This has been a particularly acute issue during American
military operations when forcible regime change has been followed by extensive occupations involving punitive
measures against elements of the population. Whether American leaders decide to use the label ‘empire’ or not is
largely irrelevant; if world opinion decides that if it looks, sounds and acts like an empire, the label will stick.
America’s decision after 1945 to rigorously defend and help expand the boundaries of global democracy left it in a
self-created position of being the guardian of a global liberal order. As Britain demonstrated in the nineteenth
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century, some nations go in search of an empire. What America has shown in the twentieth century is that some
nations have empires thrust upon them. As twenty-ﬁrst century America enters the era of the Trump presidency,
considerations of America’s global ‘empire’ are being fundamentally reassessed by the new president’s neo-
isolationist intonation at his inaugural address. Whether by accident or design, all empires eventually shrink.
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